Modern governments have to decide many disputes arising out of regulation or benefit schemes. There are various models of administrative dispute resolution available. The disputes can be adjudicated by a national court system or within the agency that made the initial decision but subject to judicial review. A third way is adjudication by specialized courts or tribunals. The US relies heavily, but not exclusively, on adjudication within its agencies, while Australia and the UK rely on national administrative appeal tribunals. This article discusses these different approaches.
The APA contains provisions for trial-type procedures for agency hearings required by statute. Specially qualified quasi-independent adjudicators, who are now called administrative law judges ("ALJs"), preside over these formal adjudications. 3 The APA calls for separation of functions between decisionmakers and agency prosecutors or investigators. Although the rules of evidence are relaxed and cross-examination may be limited, these hearings resemble courtroom trials. The ALJ writes the initial decision in the case but there may be internal agency appellate review (by the agency head or a delegate of the agency head). Judicial review (on legal, factual, and discretionary issues) is available in the federal courts, but such review is deferential and is based on the administrative record, not on a new record made in court. In this manner, a fair hearing is provided inside the agency.
Federal agencies conduct a vast range of adjudication that is not governed by the APA. Some of it (such as immigration disputes) entails relatively formal trial-type hearings that are presided over by an administrative judge ("AJ"), rather than an ALJ. Even in informal adjudication, agencies generally craft "some kind of hearing" 4 and judicial review proceeds in a similar way.
Administrative adjudication in Australia

Internal review
In Australia, adjudication by Commonwealth ministries and agencies is not governed by an APA-like code, but instead by provisions in individual statutes and by the common law principles of "natural justice," roughly similar to US due process. As with US informal adjudication, the variety of first-level decisions is so great that it makes any generalization about the application of natural justice principles difficult.
Commonwealth agencies maintain a variety of different systems of internal review of decisions unfavorable to private parties under regulatory or benefit statutes. 5 Most (but not all) of the internal review systems are provided for by statute. Generally, agencies provide an opportunity for an internal merits review by an official who was not involved in the initial decision. The review process often furnishes an opportunity for written submission and sometimes involves an opportunity for an oral contact in person or over the phone between the private party and the reviewer, although not a hearing. In addition, reviewers usually contact the primary decisionmaker to discuss the facts and reasons for the decision. Reviewers will inform the private party of the outcome of the review decision and of the availability of external review. In many cases, it is necessary for the private party to exhaust the internal review process before seeking external review before a tribunal.
For example, in Social Security cases, clients are encouraged (but not required) to request reconsideration from the primary decisionmaker. If that fails, they must seek review of the disputed decision by the Authorized Review Officer ("ARO") before proceeding to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. Review by the ARO generally involves a meeting (or at least a phone conversation) with the applicant, the opportunity to submit additional evidence, and a statement of the reasons why the ARO has refused to change the decision.
External review in tribunals 6
Securities and Investments Commission involving corporate takeovers 14 and the Australian Competition Tribunal ("the ACT", formerly the Trade Practices Tribunal) reviews decisions of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. 15 The AAT "falls within the portfolio of the Attorney General," 16 while the specialized tribunals are within that of the relevant department minister. Most of the states and territories have an AAT-counterpart and some specialized tribunals as well. 17 a. The AAT As of January 27, 2010, there were 89 "Members" of the AAT, representing a mix of parttime and full time judges, lawyers and lay members with "expertise in a range of areas, including accountancy, aviation, engineering, law, medicine, pharmacology, military affairs, public administration and taxation."
18 There were 154 staff persons serving the AAT as of June 30, 2009. The AAT President must be a judge of the Federal Court. There are nineteen other part-time "Presidential Members"-eight Federal Court judges and five judges of the Family Court of Australia, and six full-time Deputy Presidents who must have been enrolled as legal practitioners for at least five years. There were 63 other members, some of whom were senior members and most of whom were part time. Not all of the non-judicial members need be lawyers.
Appointments to the AAT are made by the Governor-General (the Queen"s representative in Australia), on the advice of the Attorney General. 19 The appointments process is based primarily on informal and largely unregulated consultation within government and between departments and tribunals. Federal tribunal members serve for fixed terms of three, five or seven years with possibility of reappointment. The informal appointments process and the relative shortness of terms have a bearing on the independence of the tribunals. AAT members may be removed by Parliament, "for "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" and must be dismissed for bankruptcy" and salaries are set "by an independent remuneration tribunal." This mix of provisions leads Professor Cane to conclude that although the independence of the members of the AAT is better protected than that of members of the specialist federal merits review tribunals, it is much less well protected than that of court judges. 20 AAT members are also less well protected than US ALJs, although better protected than most US AJs.
The AAT can only review a decision if a statute so provides but there are over 400 such enactments. 21 The AAT received 6,226 applications for review in the 2008-09 year. 22 During that period, it provided 1,393 hearings. Of these, 390 decisions set aside the decision appealed from, 96 varied the decision, and 907 affirmed the decision. 23 The most important of the AAT"s jurisdictions are second-tier hearings in social security and veterans" benefits cases (after such matters were heard initially in the SSAT and the VRB) as well as workers" compensation and tax disputes. 24 The AAT achieves some specialization because it is split into four divisions. 25 There are a number of specialized adjudicatory tribunals whose decisions cannot be reviewed by the AAT (including the MRT, RRT, and the National Native Title Tribunal). 26 In addition, the AAT does not review decisions by the Takeovers Panel or the ACT.
Although not a court, the AAT functions like one with a full array of prehearing, alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and, if necessary, hearing processes. 27 At the "hearing" stage, while the parties can agree to a decision "on the papers," there is a right to a formal adversarial proceeding, with testimony under oath and a right to be represented by lawyers. While the tribunal may perform some research on legal issues, it relies on the parties to elicit the facts, rather than on its own research. 28 However, the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply, neither party bears the burden of proof, and the respondent agency must forward a statement of reasons and all relevant documents to the tribunal. Decisions are supposed to be based on the civil standard "the balance of probability," similar to the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard in the US 29 The AAT can set decisions aside for error of law (subject to judicial review). Tribunal decisions on legal issues do not constitute binding precedent in subsequent tribunal cases. However, the managerial staff of tribunals circulate such decisions and strive for consistency. 30 On the other hand, with respect to fact finding, issue estoppel may apply if an earlier court or tribunal made a final ruling on an issue of fact. 31 Finally, section 44 of the AAT Act specifies that "A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding."
32 This means, of course, that either party may appeal. Since 1999, some of these cases may be transferred first to the lower Federal Magistrates Court. The largest specialized Commonwealth tribunal is the SSAT, a statutory body that conducts merits review of administrative decisions made under social security law, family assistance law and various other pieces of legislation. 35 The SSAT operates as the first tier of external merits review in the social security appeals system. Further rights of appeal for all parties to a social security appeal include a full merits review by the AAT as well as judicial review. 37 Most hearing panels consist of two members depending on the nature and complexity of the application. "The SSAT is "inquisitorial" in its approach. Each SSAT panel takes a fresh look at the matter, including the consideration of events which might have occurred since the decision being appealed was made."
Applications to the SSAT in 2008-09 totaled 16,319 lodged and 16,668 finalized. About 25-30% of all appeals led to a reversal or change. The average time for publishing a decision was about 10 weeks. Appeals to the SSAT are free and travel and accommodation costs are borne by the Tribunal, with a total average cost per applicant of nearly AUS $32,700.
Contrast to the US
There is a sharp contrast between the US and Australian systems of administrative adjudication. The US generally provides a hearing inside the agency that made the initial determination, often but not always before an ALJ. The final administrative decision is usually reserved to the head of the agency or to an appellate body within the agency. In contrast, Australian adjudication is provided by an internal review procedure, followed by a merits review consisting of a trial-type hearing provided outside the adjudicating agency. Most such hearings are provided by the VRB, the SSAT, the RRT, the MRT, or the AAT. The AAT is a centralized administrative tribunal providing review of the decisions of hundreds of agencies (and which provides a second tier review of SSAT and VRB decisions). Both countries provide for judicial review of agency or tribunal adjudicatory decisions, but in Australia judicial review is generally limited to questions of law.
Administrative adjudication in the UK
The design of the Australian tribunal system (prior to its redesign in 1976) closely resembled the UK tribunal system. Administrative tribunals date from the dawn of the British welfare state in the early years of the Twentieth Century (particularly the National Insurance Act of 1911). 38 Policymakers felt that resolution of the huge number of disputes arising out of this legislation should not be assigned to the courts, both because of the sheer number of cases and because the courts were perceived as being hostile to social legislation. 39 Instead, the dispute resolution function was assigned to tribunals, meaning administrative units engaged exclusively in adjudication and outside the regular court system. These tribunals were often staffed with a mix of lawyers, specialists, and lay people and their proceedings tended to be quite informal.
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In general, British tribunals have always provided a form of merits review, meaning that they conduct a de novo hearing of a matter under dispute and issue a decision on the merits with little or no deference to the prior departmental decision (or lower level tribunal decision). Unsurprisingly, Australian lawyers, judges, and policymakers, who were steeped in British practice, followed suit when they came to organize their own system of administrative adjudication. It seemed most natural to them to follow the British practice by creating a new tribunal to deal with the adjudication generated by each new regulatory or welfare program.
This adaptation of existing British institutions illustrates the "path dependence" phenomenon in which institutions are built to resemble those already in existence. 41 It is often more natural and efficient to copy what already exists and seems to be working tolerably well than to redesign and rebuild institutions from scratch. This is true even if the older model evolved more or less serendipitously and the older model is decidedly suboptimal.
In most cases, the disputes adjudicated by British tribunals arose from the decisions of a specific department of government. Prior to the recent amendments discussed below, most tribunals were organizationally part of the department whose decisions they reviewed. The tribunals thus were reliant on that department for services and other resources. Nevertheless, tribunal members typically regarded themselves as independent of the department and they did not engage in functions other than adjudication.
Each new piece of welfare or regulatory legislation created a new tribunal. The result was a hodgepodge of different tribunals with varying jurisdictions, each with its own system of appointment of members and procedures. Especially after World War II, the number of specialized tribunals continued to increase rapidly with little attempt to achieve consistency either in the organization or procedures of the tribunals or in the details relating to judicial review of their decisions.
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In 1955, the Franks Committee took a fresh look at tribunals. 43 It recommended the establishment of a Council on Tribunals and also promoted a judicialized model of tribunal procedure as well as openness, fairness, and impartiality of tribunal decisionmaking. It recommended that tribunals be required to state reasons for their decisions and it favored appeal to a superior tribunal and judicial review on points of law. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 implemented many of the recommendations of the Franks Committee; although it applied only to certain tribunals and left many unregulated, it improved tribunal procedure and adopted a requirement that tribunals give reasons for their decisions. The Council on Tribunals conducted studies of tribunal procedures and issued numerous recommendations. Meanwhile, the courts began to intensify judicial review of tribunal decisions. 44 This created a generally satisfactory situation which remained stable until the close of the century. Around 2000, the Social Security Tribunals were merged into an Appeals Service with common procedures and a single appeals structure. 45 The enactment of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ("TCEA") 46 is an epochal event in the history of British administrative law. The TCEA involves a radical upgrading and centralization of the tribunal function. The TCEA must have been significantly influenced by the successful Australian experiment with a single centralized administrative tribunal, although it did not go as far in that direction as the Australian model.
Under the TCEA, the existing tribunals were brought under a single Tribunals Service. The Tribunals Service provides the necessary resources (such as engaging staff and acquiring property), thus breaking the long-standing pattern of dependence of tribunals on the departments whose decisions they reviewed. 47 The TCEA requires that the Judicial Appointments Commission recommend the appointment of judges and lay members of tribunals; the actual appointments are made by the Lord Chancellor. This appointment system thus supplants the prior practice under which appointments to tribunals were made by departments or ministers. The TCEA also protects the independence of tribunal members and provides for a Senior President of Tribunals, a position to be held by a judge who represents the views of tribunal members to Parliament and the various ministers responsible for specific departments. Also, The Senior President is empowered to promulgate practice directions.
The TCEA grouped the jurisdictions of many (though not all) of the formerly free-standing specialized tribunals into several "chambers." These chambers are referred to as "first-tier tribunals." 48 The first-tier tribunals adjudicate disputes between private parties and government under a wide range of regulatory and welfare statutes. First-tier tribunals can reconsider and correct their own decisions on their own initiative or on petition of a party.
The TCEA also provides for an Upper Tribunal (which is treated as a court of record) and is also divided into chambers. The Upper Tribunal provides for appeals on a point of law from first-tier tribunals (with leave from either the first-tier tribunal or the Upper Tribunal). 49 The Upper Tribunal can reconsider its own decisions and grant judicial review of tribunal decisions in the form of a prerogative writ. It can also award monetary damages. 50 The TCEA provides for a further appeal on an important point of principle from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal (but only if the Upper Tribunal or the Court of Appeal gives leave to appeal). 51 The TCEA brings tribunals and courts into a single integrated adjudicatory system for the dispensation of procedural justice in administrative law. It has severed the connection between tribunals and the departments whose decisions they review. For all practical purposes, the TCEA seems to abolish any distinction between tribunals and courts. In this respect, the TCEA goes much further than Australia in integrating its tribunals into the judicial system; Australians would raise serious constitutional objections to such a move. On the other hand, the Australian AAT centralizes adjudicatory power into a single adjudicating entity (as opposed to the multiple chambers that remain under the TCEA).
Separation of powers under the Australian Constitution
Australia chose a tribunal model of adjudication, rather than a combined-function model, largely because it was heavily influenced by British practice. However, another reason for the development of the Australian tribunal system was the approach taken by the Australian High Court to constitutional separation of powers. The Australian constitution drew heavily on the separation-of-powers provisions of the US constitution (while preserving British-style parliamentary supremacy). For that reason, Australia might have chosen to follow the American "combined functions" model for administrative adjudication. However, Australia did not and could not adopt the combined-function model because it maintains a much stronger version of separation of powers than does the US. Under the Australian approach to separation of powers, the judicial branch cannot exercise executive functions (sometimes referred to as "administrative functions") and the executive branch cannot exercise judicial functions.
52 Of course, the terms "executive," "administrative," and "judicial" are hardly selfdefining and the application of these vague criteria has caused much difficulty.
The American approach toward delegation of adjudicatory power to non-Article III judges
American constitutional law takes a more pragmatic approach to separation of powers than does Australian law. American doctrine tolerates statutory arrangements by which the powers of the three branches are shared with the others, but guards against statutes that enable Congress to broaden its own powers at the expense of other branches or that unduly impair the ability of other branches to carry out their assigned functions.
Thus it has long been clear that Congress can delegate judicial power to an administrative agency, at least with respect to so-called "public rights." Broadly speaking, "public rights" involve disputes between private parties and the United States. 53 Typical public rights disputes involve claims to government benefits or enforcement of the tax laws, as well as federal law enforcement against private parties and enforcement of the immigration laws.
In the leading case of Crowell v Benson, 54 the Supreme Court upheld the delegation to a federal agency to adjudicate a case of "private rights," meaning a private-versus-private dispute. Crowell involved an employee"s claim against the employer for workers" compensation in a maritime dispute. 55 This was a statutory right of action as opposed to a traditional common law claim. It remained unclear whether Congress could assign the adjudication of such traditional tort or contract claims to a non-Article III adjudicator. In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that the adjudication of a traditional private-versus-private contract dispute could not be delegated to a non-Article III adjudicator. 56 Clearly, the Court was concerned that Congress might strip the federal courts of large portions of their traditional jurisdiction by assigning broad swatches of it to agencies or other non-Article III bodies and might even preclude judicial review of their determinations.
Northern Pipeline was swiftly undermined by later decisions. In Thomas, 57 the Court upheld a system of agency-operated binding arbitration of claims by a prior pesticide registrant for compensation arising out of the use by a later registrant of the prior registrant"s data. The key was that the private right was newly created and closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme. Finally, in Schor, the Court approved a delegation to an agency of the power to decide a contract counterclaim that was ancillary to a statutory system of reparations in favor of customers who claimed that their brokers had violated the rules. 58 If the agency could not adjudicate the contract counterclaim asserted by the broker, the entire system of reparations would have collapsed. The language of the Schor decision stresses pragmatism and the balancing of all factors in determining whether the assignment of a particular type of private right claim is improper.
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Australian agencies cannot exercise judicial powers
In the remarkable Wheat case of 1915, 60 the High Court of Australia firmly committed the country to strict separation of judicial and executive powers. The Australian Constitution of 1900 provided for an Inter-State Commission (ISC) to regulate trade between the states and it explicitly provided that the ISC would have "such powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary." 61 The American Interstate Commerce Commission (created in 1887) was clearly one of the models for the ISC along with some British regulatory agencies. However, the High Court held that the ISC could not exercise judicial power. If an agency could not be given judicial powers by an explicit constitutional provision, Parliament certainly lacked authority to delegate such powers by a statute. The Wheat case sounded the death knell in Australia for the combined function approach to administrative adjudication. 62 In the leading Boilermakers' case, 63 the Court made it clear that judicial and non-judicial powers could not be combined in the same body. The case concerned the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, a labor arbitration body created by Parliament under a specific constitutional authority. 64 The High Court held that the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration could render arbitral awards, as arbitration is not a judicial function. 65 However, that Court could not be given the power to enforce its own awards through an injunction or a contempt order, since enforcement of an arbitral award against a union is a judicial function. 66 Apparently the court that is called upon to enforce an arbitral award is not expected to retry the merits; the arbitral decision established the "factum" on which judicial enforcement depends. 67 Wheat seemed to rule out adjudication by a combined-function agency and Boilermakers indicated that an agency could not be given power to enforce its own decisions. As a result, Australian policymakers designed specialized adjudicatory tribunals that are independent of the department that made the underlying disputed decision and that lack enforcement power. After Boilermakers, Australian courts had to decide precisely what executive agencies could not do. As Boilermakers suggests, an agency cannot have the power to enforce its own judgment through the normal process of judicial execution. The clearest authority to this effect is the Brandy case involving anti-discrimination law. 68 Under the law prior to 1992, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") could adjudicate discrimination cases but its decisions were not legally enforceable. A victim of discrimination had to make a fresh application to the Federal Court which, after a rehearing, could make such orders as it thought fit. In 1992, Parliament amended the Act so that HREOC"s determination could be "registered" with the Federal Court. If the losing party sought review, the court "may review all issues of fact and law" but no new evidence could be introduced. If the losing party did not seek judicial review (or if the Federal Court affirmed HREOC"s decision), the HREOC decision (which might call for monetary damages or specific relief) became enforceable like any other judgment.
In Brandy, the High Court invalidated these amendments, holding that a proceeding is inevitably judicial if the tribunal that renders it has power to enforce it by execution or otherwise. 69 Consequently, the case would have to be retried in the federal court before the decision could be enforced. The Brandy decision immobilized Australian anti-discrimination law and, if it were read broadly, could have cast doubt on the constitutional validity of other administrative adjudicatory tribunals whose decisions are more or less self-enforcing.
To an American reader, the Brandy decision seems hopelessly formalistic. Given that Boilermakers accepted the idea that an executive arbitral decision could be the factum on which judicial enforcement rested, the rejection of HREOC"s registration mechanism seems unfounded. The Brandy decision appears to reflect a judicial distaste for anti-discrimination law (or perhaps doubts about the impartiality of HREOC) and it may reflect judicial disinclination to part with jurisdiction over a type of case that resembles traditional tort litigation.
Both before and after Brandy, the High Court has repeatedly been forced to answer the question of whether a particular package of adjudicatory and enforcement powers delegated to a particular agency adds up to an exercise of judicial power. 70 This unfortunate result is inevitable, since the decisions are defending a distinction that does not exist. The realities of modern administration have forced the High Court to retreat steadily from the absolutist separation of powers rhetoric of cases like Wheat, Boilermakers and Brandy. In the contemporary world, government agencies are empowered to adjudicate a huge range of regulatory and welfare disputes between private parties or between private parties and government. Administrative adjudication of such disputes is clearly necessary to the functioning of modern society. 71 Courts could not possibly handle this enormous body of adjudicatory work. Administrative decisions are largely self-enforcing but the enforcement process sometimes requires judicial assistance. Given this array of administrative dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, it is impossible to say which adjudicatory decisions are "administrative" and which are "judicial."
Notwithstanding cases like Boilermakers and Brandy, the High Court has in fact approved various administrative adjudication schemes that are largely self-enforcing. Some of these cases involve schemes in which the primary agency decision is in question; others involve merit review schemes. But all of them are enforceable (either against private parties or against government) without the need for de novo judicial consideration. Thus agencies can remove a trademark from the registry of trademarks.
72 They can adjudicate tax disputes.
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They can adjudicate pension disputes. 74 They can establish child support obligations. 75 Most importantly, administrative tribunals can invalidate contracts or order relief against unfair business practices such as monopolization. Under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 as well as earlier legislation, the ACT can declare a contract unenforceable or restrain a practice if the contract or practice is "contrary to the public interest" and such decisions have the force of law. 76 The Takeovers Panel can invalidate a corporate acquisition. Courts are prohibited from affording judicial remedies but have jurisdiction to enforce the Panel"s decisions. 77 At this point, an outside reader is baffled; how, if at all, are such responsibilities and enforcement powers different from those involved in Brandy or Boilermakers?
Australian courts cannot exercise executive power
As discussed above, Australian executive departments cannot exercise judicial power. Just as importantly, a federal court cannot exercise executive power. Providing merits review of the factual or the discretionary aspects of a government decision is considered an executive power. Consequently, a court is precluded from providing such review. Australians believe that it would be deeply improper for a court to interfere in the substance of executive decisionmaking by substituting its judgments about factual or discretionary matters for the judgment of an agency. 78 Yet it is plain that some form of merits review of the factual and discretionary basis of the adjudicatory decisions of government agencies must be provided. Since courts cannot supply merits review of factual or discretionary determinations because of separation of powers constraints, such review must occur within the executive branch.
The Kerr Committee report of 1971 explicitly determined that courts could not provide merits review of administrative decisions. Consequently, it recommended adoption of a peak merits review tribunal and creation of the AAT implemented that recommendation. 79 
The AAT in practice
The Australian AAT is an attractive model. It has attained a high degree of legitimacy in Australia, as shown by the spread of tribunals in both the Commonwealth and in the Australian states. Before considering whether the Australian model might be transplanted to the US, a more detailed examination of the pros and cons of the AAT is in order.
The AAT's procedures
The AAT"s organic statute states that "In carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick." 80 Of course, as Professor Creyke has pointed out, "[c]omplying with this litany of adjectives has created difficulties . . . not least because they are internally inconsistent." 81 The procedures are supposed to be "conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit"; moreover, "the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate."
82 But as the famous Mathews v Eldridge balancing test for measuring due process in the US implicitly acknowledges, accuracy, fairness and efficiency values are often at odds.
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AAT's mix of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures
As mentioned before, the AAT provides a blend of adversarial and inquisitorial process, 84 while the specialized tribunals tend to be closer to the inquisitorial end of the spectrum. 85 a. Pro-activity in obtaining evidence
One issue is whether the AAT sufficiently uses its inquisitorial powers to require submission of material documents from the parties or even to gather other information, especially where the applicant is unrepresented. 86 Professor Cane concludes that the AAT could do more: "on the whole . . . it seems that Australian merits tribunals rarely obtain information other than from or through the applicant and the decision-maker." In part, as he acknowledges, this is a resource issue, and without the availability of staff to find witnesses or information not produced by the parties, "the most that tribunals are likely to do is to invite, encourage, or perhaps, require, parties to provide additional evidence." 87 At any rate the law does not require more at this point: although Creyke and McMillan point to several tribunal decisions that have been held invalid for failing to consider whether additional evidence was needed, or seeking clarity on matters deemed unclear or obscure, 88 "the settled principle is . . . that there is no general legal duty on a tribunal to conduct inquiries." 89 A discussion paper for the Australian Law Reform Commission proposed an amendment to the AAT Act to require the tribunal to be take a more proactive investigative role in cases involving unrepresented parties, but the proposal was never formally recommended. Since it is not a court, the AAT can be more flexible in its receipt of expert evidence. Some tribunal members obviously have some expertise of their own, and "it is generally accepted that tribunal members should be freer than judges to draw on their own personal knowledge and to "take notice" of information not presented by the parties." 91 However, parties need to be given a chance to object to the taking of official notice or information obtained from third parties. 92 This is no different from the APA"s rules on ALJ hearings in the US 93 However, tribunals sometimes have been creative in arranging for concurrent presentation of expert evidence in so-called hot tubs; instead of experts presenting evidence individually, a number of experts are brought together in one session at which areas of agreement and difference can be explored and developed by discussion and questioning between the experts themselves. 94 c. Other rules of evidence The AAT Act states that "the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, but may inform itself in such manner as it thinks appropriate" 95 -a standard that is even more unrestrictive than that of the US APA. It is commonplace for new evidence to arise during the period between the agency decision and the tribunal hearing. Merits review tribunals generally review the facts as they exist at the time of the review, not at the time of the agency decision. 97 This "contemporaneous review" presents its own set of problems. By the time of the review, the agency may have changed its "administrative outlook," but, in contrast to the US, the agency cannot revise its decision, because it has already become the responsibility of the tribunal. 98 The facts may have changed and, in many cases, the applicant can produce new evidence that was not before the decisionmaker below. This "open record" concept also exists in US Social Security and veterans" benefit cases, and it has been criticized for creating incentives to hold back evidence. The same concerns have been raised about the tribunals" open record policy. 99 It should be noted that intervening changes in the law may or may not be applied by the tribunal, depending on whether the law itself states whether the change applies to pending proceedings. 100 
Role of the agency decisionmaker as a party before the AAT
The responding agency must provide a statement of findings and reasons for its decision and any other document that it has (or controls) that it is relevant to the review. 101 Somewhat surprisingly, its overall responsibility is to "assist the Tribunal to make its decision," not to act in an adversary fashion. 102 This is consistent with the AAT"s merits review responsibility to make the "correct or preferable" decision, but it must be difficult for the agency representative to undergo this "attitudinal adjustment."
On the other hand, the Federal Court did overturn an AAT ruling in a workers" compensation case that a subsequently discovered agency video of the applicant should have been disclosed to the applicant prior to its introduction in the hearing so as to allow sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination. 103 Subsequent decisions of the AAT, however, have distinguished this decision, criticizing it as creating "litigation by ambush." 104 
Burden-of-proof considerations
Given the roles of the parties, how do burden of proof considerations factor into the AAT"s decision? Even though, "as a practical matter . . . it is in the interest of a party to [present] evidence to persuade the tribunal," 105 it seems to be the case that with respect to the tribunals, "it is not appropriate to talk in terms of a formal onus or burden of proof," unless an underlying statute contains one. 106 This is because "the AAT is required . . . to make its own decision in place of the administrator." 107 This rationale tends to beg the question, and Professor Pearson explains that the question of how tribunals "proceed when left in a state of uncertainty" is that they generally "turn to the applicable legislation, which will usually be worded in terms requiring the decision-maker to reach a state of satisfaction on a particular issue. . . ." 108 Evaluating whether this requirement has been met obviously requires the tribunal to give careful attention to the findings and reasons provided by the decision maker; it can be especially difficult for the tribunal to "balance assessment of credibility based on oral evidence with what might at first appear to be more "reliable" documentary material, such as . . . information prepared by government agencies." 109 In the end, the "balance of probability" standard is "ordinarily the appropriate standard to be applied by an administrative tribunal." 
Alternative dispute resolution ('ADR') techniques.
The AAT and other tribunals rely heavily on techniques to avoid formal hearings. To begin with, occasionally the tribunal may determine that the papers filed by the respondent agency allow for a favourable decision for the applicant "on the papers.
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" The AAT may also decide to proceed on the papers with both parties" consent. 112 Many cases also settle through party conferences with an AAT member, or through other ADR processes such as mediation. 113 In 2008-09, the AAT resolved 5,838 cases without a hearing and provided only 1,393 hearings. 114 Thus only 19% of the cases lodged in the AAT actually resulted in a hearing. However, the AAT must agree to the disposition because "[o]nce an application for review has been made, the AAT alone can bring the proceedings to an end." 115 This also prevents an agency from trying to "pull back" an appeal.
Decisionmaking and opinion-writing
The AAT"s decisions from 1976 to the present are available on line on the Australasian Legal Information Institute"s website. 116 According to Professor Creyke, decisions of the AAT, because it is not a court, are not precedential. 117 However, issues of consistency and following precedent can occur with respect to prior tribunal rulings on both legal and factual questions. Although, of course, the AAT does not have the last word on legal interpretation questions, sometimes a case will involve a legal issue that has been decided in an earlier unappealed AAT case. The AAT"s Deputy President has opined that, in that situation, the decision in the earlier case should be followed, especially if the decision was made by a presidential member, although the member deciding the later case could note his or her disagreement with the result. 118 
Generalized vs specialized expertise
Given that the AAT has jurisdiction over cases involving over 400 statutes, and that its members are a mix of lawyers and non lawyers, some full-time and some part-time, one might legitimately wonder whether the Tribunal can handle cases from agencies that present difficult and technical issues. Of course this objection has been leveled at federal judges in the United States who hear appeals from a multitude of agencies. The difference is that US judicial review of disputes about fact findings and exercises of discretion is limited to a "reasonableness" form of review (the "substantial evidence" test for formal adjudication and the "arbitrary and capricious" test for informal adjudication). Similarly, in the US, judicial review of questions of law is usually quite deferential to the agency"s interpretation of statutes and of its own regulations.
The literature on Australia"s tribunals does not appear to view this as a serious concern, even though AAT members are not provided with legal or technical assistance. Perhaps the AAT"s ability to call on the decision making agency for additional documents and to call upon the agency"s counsel to assist the tribunal in making the "correct or preferable" decision is regarded as giving AAT members the tools they need. In addition, the AAT does not review tribunal decisions relating to takeovers and trade practices that might present issues beyond the ken of many AAT members 119 or most decisions relating to immigration and refugee policy, which may reflect political considerations. Finally, it should be noted that several high volume specialized tribunals (the SSAT and VRB) siphon many cases away from the AAT (although the AAT provides merits review of challenged SSAT and VRB decisions that are unfavourable to the applicant).
Following governmental policy
Whether tribunals must follow agency policy presents an important and recurring issue. This is also a question that confronts US ALJs. In Australia, an influential AAT decision, Drake No. 2 120 held that the AAT should apply a presumption in favour of relevant government policies (assuming that the "policy" does not conflict with "hard law" such as a statute or regulation). The AAT should depart from policy only for "cogent reasons," such as injustice in an individual case, but not because it disagrees with the policy in general. One reason for deference to policy is to achieve consistency between unappealed decisions and AAT decisions. 121 Another is to keep the AAT out of politics and avoid clashes with government departments; its job is to adjudicate, not set government policy. 122 These generalities leave open questions as to whether the tribunal"s duty to depart from government policy only for cogent reasons is affected by the level of the policymaker (ministerial, departmental, or lower) or the procedure used to issue the policy (after public consultation or without it). Andrew Edgar has focused on the distinction, often suggested by academic commentators and found in case law, between "high" and "low" policy. High policy comes from the minister, and is subject to "ministerial responsibility," and scrutinized by Parliament; Drake 2 requires the AAT to follow high policy. Low policy, on the other hand, comes from soft law issued by the department. The AAT either ignores or considers but feels free to redetermine low policy. Edgar criticizes this distinction and suggests that the AAT should defer to both high and low policy, because the failure to defer to soft law results in inconsistent decisionmaking by different AAT panels and the substitution of a less informed for a more informed determination of appropriate policy. 123 He argues that the AAT lacks the relevant information to make proper judgments about policy because often the rationale for the policy is not articulated in the department"s decision, which is specific to the facts of the case. Moreover, he contends that lack of deference produces an accountability problem because the AAT"s decision on policy is not reviewable either in court or as a political matter (other than through parliamentary legislation).
Nor is Edgar any more enamoured of a distinction based on whether or not the policy was developed after public consultation. He observes that agencies can "cherry-pick" from among the comments that are "consistent with their pre-determined view and ignore other submissions," but tribunals would not know when this sort of "charade" had taken place. 124 He also opines that some agency policies promulgated without consultations (including interpretive rules) are quite legitimate and should be followed by tribunals.
Professor Cane takes a more positive view of tribunal review of policy that is spelled out in soft law. He believes that these policies are certainly relevant considerations for the tribunal, but they are not binding. In his view, the AAT is entitled to refuse to apply a lawful policy not only because the policy leads to injustice in the particular case but also because the AAT believes the policy is not sound or wise. Moreover, he goes on to say that the AAT would also be "entitled to enunciate a new policy, inconsistent with an existing policy, as the basis for varying a decision or making a substitute decision." 125 He bases this conclusion on the fact that the power to undertake merits review includes the power to substitute a correct or preferable decision, and that must encompass the power to act inconsistently with government policy. However, he tempers his point by suggesting that the differences between high and low policy or policies developed with and without consultation are appropriate factors for the Tribunal to consider.
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Would the Australian tribunal model work in the US?
Could the US borrow from the Australian experience? We believe that something like the Australian tribunal model might work in the area of federal benefits adjudication. These are mass justice systems in which decisionmakers must deal with a heavy caseload. Individual cases largely turn on medical and vocational issues and are not used as vehicles for the announcement of policy.
For the purposes of this article, we limit our proposal to an independent Social Security Tribunal ("SST") which would be similar to the Australian SSAT. However, we also believe that policymakers should consider whether the SST might be expanded to cover adjudication arising under some or all of the other federal benefit programs, including schemes administered by the Veterans" Administration and the Department of Labor. If that were to occur, the result would be a federal benefits tribunal of generalized jurisdiction, much like the AAT. Our discussion does not include the judicial review stage, but we also believe that policymakers should consider establishing a Social Security Court to review SST decisions.
The hearing stage of the Social Security adjudication system has encountered problems. Most importantly, it struggles with an overwhelming caseload. A combative atmosphere between Social Security ALJs and the Social Security Administration ("SSA") has lingered for years. SSA must manage its ALJs to improve the efficiency, accuracy and consistency of the decision making process. In the past, however, some of these management decisions were explicitly (and wrongly) designed to reduce the number of people on the disability rolls and to reduce the percentages of ALJ decisions in favour of applicants. 128 This has given ALJs and lawyers who represent applicants a basis for condemning SSA management initiatives as subversive of ALJ independence. 129 On the other hand, it must be recognized that many of the problems of SSA adjudication arise out of problems with the ALJ program itself. The general process by which ALJs are hired and managed has often been criticized. 130 Under the APA, ALJs are hired without a probationary period and receive indefinite tenure. Application of the veterans" preference effectively excludes many non-veterans and creates gender and racial disparities. The Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") runs the hiring process which is cumbersome and bureaucratic. The OPM has often neglected or mismanaged this task. The system requires an agency to choose from among the top three on the list offered to it by the OPM, thus foreclosing any exercise of judgment by the hiring agency. This rigid hiring system is circumvented by many agencies which cherry-pick from the judges already working for SSA. Alone among all federal civil servants, ALJs are exempt from performance evaluations and it is extremely difficult to discipline or discharge them, especially for low productivity.
The ALJ selection and disciplinary protections arise from explicit provisions of the APA. The APA struck many political compromises, one of which was to leave the judges housed within the agencies for which they decide cases while constructing a set of protections for their independence within that agency. However, if the ALJs functioned within a tribunal separate from the agency that made the decision under review, many of those protections would become unnecessary. 131 An SST would be independent of the SSA. 132 Its judges could continue to provide informal, inquisitorial methods when that was appropriate. At present, the SSA is unrepresented in disability cases, so the ALJ wears multiple hats (making sure that both the SSA and applicant"s position is properly presented, then deciding the case). Of course, the SST judges would be required to follow SSA regulations as well as properly issued soft law policy statements or interpretations propounded by the SSA. Decisions by the SST would be final administrative decisions. 133 The next step would be judicial review, possibly limited to questions of law. Of course, both the applicant for benefits and the SSA could seek judicial review of SSAT.
Creation of the SST would enable a reconsideration of the various management issues currently plaguing the system of Social Security hearings. Judges would work for the SST, not for the SSA. As a result, there would be no need for the APA"s rigid controls on the hiring, supervision, compensation, evaluation, and discharge of ALJs. The SST could hire its own judges using a rational, judgment-based scheme to get the very best people available, as opposed to the wooden system now used by the OPM. 134 There could be probationary employment, to weed out unsuitable judges early in their career. Judges" terms would be lengthy but not indefinite and they could be removed only for good cause. There could be a series of grades, so judges could work toward promotion and higher compensation. More difficult cases could be assigned to more experienced judges. Some form of peer review might be instituted to evaluate the work product of the judges. The chief judge of the SST would manage the evaluation process. And if that evaluation established that judges fell below reasonable standards of productivity, misbehaved on the bench, or systematically ignored agency policies, appropriate remedial measures could be put in place from mentoring or performance agreements, including dismissal after an appropriate hearing.
This proposal presents important issues of scale. Obviously the SST would have a vastly larger corps of judges than the AAT (with its 89 members) or the SSAT (with its 230 members). Yet the judges who would staff the SST are already in place-the approximately 1,200 135 skilled, experienced and conscientious Social Security ALJs. They would be the nucleus of the SST.
The issue of consistency of decisions is always problematic in mass justice situations. As Mashaw pointed out long ago, the only way to achieve reasonable consistency of decisions among vast numbers of judges in a mass justice situation is through management initiatives, not through an appeals council or through judicial review of the procedure or the substance of such decisions. 136 Those management initiatives are far more practicable and acceptable to the judges when they come from an independent SST rather than from the SSA. For example, the SSA would have to issue more regulations and soft law pronouncements than it does today to furnish guidance to SST judges. In addition, the SST might designate important decisions by SST judges as precedent decisions that judges in later cases would be required to follow.
The political feasibility of this proposal can certainly be questioned. It is certainly possible that ALJ organizations will dig in their heels against it, opposing anything that might diminish their APA protections, or reduce the number of ALJs in their ranks. Yet many ALJs have favoured the creation of a federal central panel that would remove them from control of the agency that is party to the dispute. The SST would produce exactly that form of independence, but it could be achieved only if the ALJs were willing to accept a change to a new status as SST judges with whatever tailored protections seemed most salient to that position.
Needless to say, many practical issues would arise in so radically changing the structure of federal benefits adjudication, and there will be many compromises along the way. Of course, the hearing process is just one step in a complex state/federal process of disability claim adjudication and cannot be viewed in isolation from all the other stages. This briefly sketched proposal does not address the details or the entire process from state examiner scrutiny of a disability claim through federal court of appeals review. We seek only to point out the advantages of an independent tribunal structure in addressing some of the pathologies of the existing system of Social Security adjudication.
Conclusion
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